Motivation
Many reports (e.g. Stern, 2006) and key policy makers assert that avoiding deforestation is a key short-run climate mitigation option because of the apparently low abatement costs (Kindermann et al., 2008) . Melillo Offset programs have been shown to suffer from serious problems of spurious credits and low effectiveness as a result of adverse selection. Adverse selection is caused by a combination of two factors: a voluntary element (i.e., agents can choose whether or not to opt in to the program) and asymmetric information about the baseline (i.e., the agents know more about their true baseline than the regulator). 1 Several designs have been proposed for an international program to reduce deforestation (most recently referred to as REDD -reducing emissions from deforestation and degradation) and some are beginning to be implemented on a wider scale -notably Norway's innovative contract with Guyana.
2 All proposed policies have elements of offsets in their design and face a tradeoff between efficiency and the desire of the funders of such programs to get the best value for the money that they spend. This tradeoff exists because more generous or expensive programs (higher payments, with more favorable baselines) are more efficient. To the best of our knowledge, no one has previously formally analyzed three key options to reduce this tradeoff in a realistic policy context. In addition, while previous research has focused on designing mechanisms to reduce deforestation in developing countries in the presence of asymmetric information, the policies of the industrialized countries that buy credits or provide funds are often considered unconstrained (Strand, 1997) . This paper explicitly considers welfare in both developing and industrialized countries, and highlights the limitations that voluntary participation by industrialized countries places on the set of implementable policies. Specifically, the paper explores the role of project scale, discounting (paying less than the full value for reductions) and baseline manipulation (making baselines either more or less stringent than business as usual) in a formal model. We use a microeconomic model of land use and mechanism design with a combination of analytical results and numerical simulations to
show that (1) increasing the required scale of projects that can participate both improves efficiency and lowers transfers; (2) if industrialized countries are averse to transfers to developing countries they will optimally use a mixture of discounting and stringent baselines at the cost of some efficiency loss; and (3) if the industrialized countries can be persuaded to be more generous it will be easier to create an efficient policy to avoid deforestation. Our presentation focuses on deforestation but the results are equally applicable to any other mitigation options in developing countries, as well as wider applications of voluntary offset programs.
Our paper can be interpreted as an analysis of either adding avoided deforestation to a broader cap and trade market, or as an international fund used to pay for avoided deforestation to supplement a separate cap on other emissions. Both programs involve a baseline level of forest and provide rewards relative to that. In a cap and trade market these rewards would be credits valued at the market price, whereas in the fund these rewards would be dollars. In both programs industrialized countries pay for the reductions that are achieved in developing countries. These two approaches are equivalent under the following assumptions. First, the rewards must be the same per unit of avoided deforestation. To set fund payouts that meet this assumption requires that the aggregate marginal cost functions of the forest landowners are known so that the market price in the cap and trade system can be predicted accurately. Second, the cap and trade market emissions cap and the level of the fund can be adjusted so that regardless of which approach is used, both the global environmental outcome and the permit price are identical. That is, the fund level would need to be set such that the environmental gains it achieved were equal to the difference in environmental gains between the environmental cap of the larger broad cap and trade system (including avoided deforestation) and the original cap and trade market (excluding avoided deforestation). 4 Three criteria that are of direct relevance to policy makers are used to assess the impacts of different conditions and policies: efficiency; the level of avoided deforestation and the payments per hectare of avoided deforestation. Efficiency is determined by whether land goes to its optimal use -land that yields high agricultural or timber returns should be cleared; land with returns lower than the positive environmental externalities from the forest should not. While policy focuses only on climate related externalities, we might also be concerned about avoided deforestation as an end in itself; this is the motivation for the second criterion. The final criterion is concerned with the value that industrialized countries get for the money they transfer to developing countries.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a simple model of voluntary deforestation policy that operates first at the level of individual plots, and then for larger scales. This demonstrates the trade-off between efficiency loss from adverse selection and the level of transfers, and analyzes how the three policy criteria are affected by the shapes of the distributions of land returns and observation errors. Section 3 discusses how the potential objectives are affected by three different policy choices: increasing the scale required for participation, changing the carbon payment (equivalent to "discounting credits") and changing the generosity of the assigned baseline. Section 4 provides a framework to make optimal tradeoffs among objectives while taking into account the divergent interests of developing and industrialized countries and numerically analyzes the optimal policy. Section 5 concludes and summarizes the main policy implications.
A Simple Model of Voluntary Opt-In

Efficient subsidies versus baselines with adverse selection
Consider a continuum of plots of forested land, indexed by i. Decisions on each plot are independent. Landowners decide to either clear fully or keep the forest. Landowners will clear 4 Suppose industrialized countries (ICs) have a joint emissions cap that requires them to undertake abatement of A. Total abatement cost (TAC) is the integral under the IC marginal abatement cost curve up to A. The market price of pollution equals p c . ICs could use the fund to achieve n further units of abatement (and pay for m infra-marginal, or "spurious", units). Total global abatement would be A + n. Analogous to the fund, ICs could purchase n + m offsets from developing countries (DCs). This, however, would not be a fair comparison. Under the fund, the global abatement equals A + n. Using offsets, global abatement will be A -m. The environmental outcome is worse than without offsets (and p c would be lower). To correct this, ICs must increase their joint abatement target to A + n + m. This ensures that, after n + m offsets are purchased from DCs, the IC mitigation effort is back at A and the pollution price at p c . Global abatement is now also A + n. 
This achieves efficient deforestation but requires a large transfer of resources
The total amount of avoided deforestation is
The payment for each unit of deforestation (PAD) is the ratio TT/AD which will be very high if many plots of land have negative returns and so would not have been cleared even without the subsidy.
To avoid large transfers, a second policy option is a voluntary deforestation program that will pay participants an amount p c for each hectare of forest exceeding an assigned baseline.
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Landowners know their true forest baselines BL i :
If the regulator observes r i , the efficient solution is achieved by assigning each landowner i the true baseline BL i (r i ). If BL i = 1 (no deforestation), no payment will be made and the forest will remain intact. If BL i = 0 (full deforestation) and 0 ≤ r i ≤ p c 5 For the purposes of this paper this includes only carbon emissions. More generally it could also include nonclimate externalities, such as loss of biodiversity.
, the landowner will opt in and 6 If it were practically feasible, a policy that sets p c = r i would reduce transfers even further. In a recent paper, Mason and Plantinga (2010) describe a model in which the regulator has the option to provide landowners with a menu of two-part contracts, which consist of a lump-sum payment from the landowner to the regulator and a "per unit of forest" back to the landowner. Under certain conditions, these are type-revealing, where an ex-ante unobserved "type" corresponds to a marginal opportunity cost curve of keeping a fraction of the land forested. A similar approach to maximize the benefits to the developed country funders in an environmental transfer program was developed in Kerr, 1995 
In practice, however, the regulator cannot observe r i , but instead observes ̂= + .
The observation error ε has density f ε ~ (0, σ ε ), is assumed to be symmetric around 0 and independent of f r . The predicted baselines are
What happens if the government assigns baseline � ? When ( > 0,̂> 0) or ( ≤ 0,̂≤ 0), the assigned baseline coincides with the true baseline. The landowner will make the socially efficient decision. However, if ( > 0,̂≤ 0), the assigned baseline is 1 but the true baseline is 0. The landowner would have deforested the plot in the true baseline, but gets assigned an unfavorable "no deforestation" baseline. Hence, the landowner will not participate in the scheme. This leads to an efficiency loss if 0 ≤ r i ≤ p c = δ, since the landowner will now deforest while he would not have done so had his baseline been correctly assigned and he had participated in the scheme. Relative to the efficient outcome in (1) the efficiency loss caused by adverse selection equals
The amount of avoided deforestation will fall by
Finally, consider the case where ( ≤ 0,̂> 0). These landowners would have kept their forest, but now get assigned a full deforestation baseline. This will not affect their behavior, but it implies an additional infra-marginal transfer p c . The total transfer (TT) is now lower than the subsidy amount (2) but higher than in the full information voluntary program. Total transfers (TT) are given by the sum of marginal transfers (MT) and infra-marginal transfers (IT). The former are the payments made to landowners that change their decision to not deforesting as a result of the policy. The latter are payments to landowners that would not have deforested without the policy, but get assigned a favorable full deforestation baseline and will therefore opt in.
Because the amount of avoided deforestation is reduced relative to both the subsidy and the full information voluntary program while the total transfers lie between the two, the effect of adverse selection on payment per unit of avoided deforestation is theoretically ambiguous relative to the subsidy but clearly higher relative to the full information voluntary program.
To obtain intuition for this ambiguity, we use the decomposition in (9) to write PAD as
where IMCF denotes the amount of infra-marginally credited. Moving from a subsidy to a voluntary program reduces IMCF but also lowers AD. For most realistic distributions the reduction in IMCF is larger than the reduction in AD, so PAD would fall. The cases described above are summarized in Figure 1 . 
The impacts of observation error and returns distributions on policy objectives
The tradeoff between efficiency and transfers depends on the distributions of observation errors and returns. We now analyze the impact of each of these on our three policy objectives: economic efficiency, avoided deforestation (AD) and payments per hectare of avoided deforestation (PAD).
Effects of observation error variance
Equation (7) shows that any change in ( ) that increases the probability mass in the range [-∞, -r], where 0 ≤ r ≤ p c , will increase the efficiency loss from adverse selection (assuming
Under the same assumptions, PAD will increase. This follows from (10). Any increase in ( ) that increases the probability mass in the range [-r, ∞], where r ≤ 0, such as an increase in in a normal distribution, will increase IMCF. Since AD decreases, PAD rises. More landowners with r = δ) and decrease avoided deforestation. A mean preserving spread such that
If the distribution of errors is normal, an increase in variance will generate such a mean preserving spread.
i < 0 will now get assigned � = 0 and receive the payment p c Numerical illustration.
, but they do not provide additional deforestation.
To provide more intuition for the results with realistic distributions, we now assume a parametric form for the distribution of net agricultural returns f r (r) on forested land and the baseline prediction error f ε (ε). In the remainder of this paper, we will focus mostly on return distributions f r (r) for which F r
With no shocks, all land with positive returns would be cleared without any policy while no land with negative returns will be cleared. Hence, there will be positive probability mass below zero and no mass above zero and the assumption trivially holds. Deforestation occurs because the returns distribution shifts over time. If this shift, driven by, for example, technology and local infrastructure change, has both a common and an idiosyncratic (e.g. normal unbiased (0) > 0.5 and that are downward sloping at 0. The first assumption reflects that, at any point in time, landowners have previously chosen not to clear the remaining forest so only land on which relative returns have recently risen will still be forested but be at risk of clearing. The second assumption implies that there is a higher probability mass for returns just below zero than for returns just above zero, which intensifies the tradeoff between efficiency and reducing transfers and, in particular, infra-marginal rewards.
shock to each plot) element we would still expect the second assumption to hold. 8 We consider f
The density above zero will tend to be lower than below zero, since the tail of the normal distribution implies a negative slope. The common shock will generate a probability mass of forested land above zero return up to the size of the shock; the idiosyncratic shock will also move some land to higher returns (and some to lower) leaving lower probability mass in the upper tail of the returns distribution. ≤ δ. These will make the inefficient decision to deforest if and only if they get assigned � = 1, which happens with probability approaching 0.5 as σ ε increases. As σ ε increases, infra-marginal transfers rise. Combined, the fall in AD and rise in transfers have dramatic implications for PAD; it quickly rises from the efficient value of 0.5 (the environmental externality δ ). Even for a fairly modest σ ε
This section has shown that a mean preserving spread that increases the tails of the observation error distribution (which in a normal distribution would be implied by an increased variance) unambiguously has (weakly) negative effects on all three policy objectives. Any improvement in our ability to observe returns, or equivalently predict deforestation, would reduce the tradeoff between efficiency and transfers. This is a challenge for science and economics.
of 0.3, PAD doubles.
The impact of different marginal costs of avoiding deforestation on policy objectives
How do the policy objectives depend on the marginal abatement cost of avoided deforestation? In this model, abatement costs are represented by the foregone net return from deforestation r and the marginal abatement cost curve depends on the distribution f r
The efficiency gain relative to no policy (1) depends on f (r). Proof.
The second statement is trivial.
Proposition 1 shows that stronger assumptions on f r and f r Numerical illustration.
' are needed to ensure an increase in efficiency than an increase in AD: an increase in the probability mass between [0, δ] is sufficient for AD to increase, but not to guarantee increased efficiency. With observation errors, a change in the returns distribution also affects the likelihood of infra-marginal payments: a less negatively (more positively) sloped distribution around zero yields lower infra-marginal payments. The combined effects on AD and infra-marginal payments determine the effect on
PAD.
We now illustrate these effects using our previous numerical example with f r (r) ~ N(- We now consider a single landowner (alternatively, a region or country) who controls n 1-hectare plots. Each plot j has a return from deforestation r j . We initially assume that these returns are distributed i.i.d. over plots with density f r . Without the program, the landowner will clear all plots for which the return r j exceeds zero. Hence, the true baseline is
The government observes each r j with error ε j : ̂= + . Assume that ε j is i.i.d.
across j. This means that ̂ has a distribution with mean µ r and variance σ r 2 + σ ε 2 . The distribution of ̂ is more dispersed than f r (r). The government could compute an unbiased prediction of the baseline � as the sum of the expectation of the random variables for the plot-specific baselines. From its point of view, the true baseline for a specific plot is a Bernoulli random variable with mean p 1i and variance p 1i *(1 -p 1i ), where p 1i = Pr(r j < 0|̂) = Pr(BL j = 1|̂). Since these are non-identically but independently distributed across j, the central limit theorem yields that for n → ∞ 10 Note that p 1i ≠ Pr(̂ < 0), except if f r (r) is symmetric around zero. If the government naively assumed that r and ̂ have the same distribution, it would calculate
This would lead to a biased estimate of the baseline.
� is a continuous baseline for all n plots. 
Increasing scale and efficiency
The landowner must now decide whether or not to opt in with his entire forest area, or not participate.
This section presents numerical simulations that show that a larger scale improves efficiency for "reasonable" returns distributions. In general, however, increasing the project scale has countervailing impacts on efficiency. The overall effect is ambiguous. 
Hence, for some assigned baselines � , the landowner will still opt in, but for assigned baselines exceeding a threshold value, the landowner will opt out with all of his n plots. For this reason, the effect of increasing scale on efficiency is not a priori clear. There are cases in which scale increases efficiency: even if the baseline is too stringent, the landowner may still opt in with all n plots. Hence, all plots with returns between 0 and p c will remain forested. This leads to a higher efficiency gain than plot-specific baselines, in which some plots with returns between 0 and p c However, in some cases the efficiency of the new system is lower than with plot-specific baselines. This happens when the baseline is so unfavorable that the landowners opt out with all n plots. In the single plot program, some critical plots with returns between 0 and p will get assigned a baseline equal to 1, and opt out. Comparing the overall efficiency gain from scaling up is not straightforward analytically.
Figure 6 illustrates this for n = 2. With single-plot baselines, the expected efficiency gain relative to no policy is simply 2∆S with ∆S defined in (1) minus (7). Now consider a 2-plot baseline. The assigned baseline � 2 ∈ {0,1,2}. Figure 6 shows under what circumstances this policy yields an efficiency gain relative to no policy.
will receive a correct baseline and some deforestation will be efficiently avoided. are independent, 2-plot baselines are not always more efficient than single-plot baselines.
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A proof for the efficiency of an n-plot program is analytically difficult, but the next section presents numerical simulations to investigate the implications for realistic distributions.
Numerical simulations of increased scale
This section presents numerical simulations to illustrate the differences between a singleplot versus multiple plot program. Throughout this section, we assume a normal observation error distribution with σ ε = 0.5, unbiased assigned baselines, and p c = δ = 0.5. The central case returns distribution is f r (r) ~ N(-1,1). We also consider alternative distributions. 13 In all cases, f ε (ε) ~ N(0,0.5). Table 1 demonstrates what happens to the policy objectives as n increases. Notes: Each row is based on 10,000 random draws from the probability distributions. δ = pc = 0.5. f ε (ε) ~ N(0,0.5). ∆efficiency, AD and TT are all normalized per 100 plots. Assigned baselines are unbiased. (ε) are i.i.d: both returns and observation errors are independent across plots. In reality, there may be a high degree of spatial correlation in both returns and errors. We introduce spatial correlation across plots in the following stylized way:
where u r and u ε are i. ) and Notes: Each row is based on 10,000 random draws from the probability distributions δ = pc = 0.5. f ε (ε) ~ N(0,0.5). Δefficiency, AD and TT are all normalized per 100 plots. Assigned baselines are unbiased. Table 2 shows that only very high spatial correlation (ρ ≥ 0.9) undermines the effect of increasing scale. As the correlation across plots and errors increases, efficiency and AD decrease, and PAD increases. The intuition is that observation errors do not cancel out across plots, but are persistent. High spatial correlation reduces the probability of participation and therefore adversely impacts the policy objectives. Larger required project scale would mitigate this.
Policy 2: choosing a different payment per hectare
In the analysis above, the payment per hectare p c was assumed to be equal to the marginal externality from deforestation δ. c ≠ δ is less efficient if σ ε = 0. All landowners get assigned the true baseline, and paying less than δ reduces efficiency, because landowners with average returns ((r |0 ≤ r ≤ δ ) > p c ) would opt out. Paying more than δ reduces efficiency because some landowners will opt in even though their private gains from deforestation exceed the full environmental cost. This is inefficient from an economic perspective. 15 In the single-plot model with full and symmetric information, the change in efficiency relative to a no policy case was given in (1). A simple application of Leibniz' Rule yields that efficiency is maximized when p c = δ . We will now investigate if this result changes with asymmetric information -i.e. when σ ε
Different payments in the single-plot model
> 0.
In the single-plot model, the introduction of observation error does not change the conclusion that the most efficient payment is p c = δ. The efficiency change relative to no policy equals
Proposition 3. In the single-plot model, efficiency is maximized for p c = δ, regardless of f ε Proof. Using Leibniz' Rule, the first order condition is given by
efficiency is maximized when p (ε). can either lead to almost no additional deforestation, or a large increase in avoided deforestation, depending on the specification of the return distribution f r (r). For instance, if f r (r) = 0 for ∈ [0, ], then PAD will be infinite for p c ≤ p and achieve a global minimum for some p c > p.
Hence, PAD can either be increasing or decreasing in p c . 16 We conclude that, in the single-plot model, efficiency is maximized by paying p c = δ.
Paying more leads to more AD, but requires higher transfers. The effect on PAD is ambiguous for low values of p c
Different payments in the multi-plot model
, but eventually PAD must increase.
In the multi-plot model, p c = δ no longer unambiguously maximizes efficiency. The intuition is as follows. Raising p c above δ has two countervailing effects on efficiency. First, it will increase the opt-in probability. This increases efficiency because it helps prevent deforestation of plots with returns below δ. Second, it causes certain forest to be inefficiently prevented from deforestation. The relative strength of these channels determines whether a higher p c can be more efficient than p c = δ. A lower p c will never increase efficiency, since it will both reduce optin and cause inefficient deforestation. The effects go in the same direction. Hence, p c ≥ δ maximizes efficiency in the multiple-plot model. PAD is ambiguous in p c Table 3 shows that raising p . Table 3 illustrates this when δ = 0.5 and n = 10 or 100. c above δ can increase efficiency. For n = 10, raising p c above δ (to p c = 0.6) slightly increases efficiency. Hence, efficiency is no longer maximized at p c = δ. However, when n = 100, the opt-in probability at p c 16 Proof available from the authors on request. = δ is already almost efficient at 97.47%.
Raising p c to 0.6 increases opt-in only slightly to 98.93%. Hence, we find that the most efficient solution is sometimes achieved for p c > δ. This increased efficiency coincides with higher PAD, however. Notes: Each row is based on 10,000 random draws from the probability distributions. δ = pc = 0.5. f ε (ε) ~ N(0,0.5). Δefficiency, AD and TT are all normalized per 100 plots. Assigned baselines are unbiased.
In summary, we find that efficiency considerations never justify setting the payment p c below the environmental damage δ, and setting p c > δ can be justified if opt-in at p c = δ is below 100%. Since increasing scale leads to full opt-in in the limit, p c = δ always becomes the most efficient payment as n approaches infinity. There always exists a p' (p' > δ) such that efficiency falls and transfers rise for any p > p'. In that price region, the outcome is unambiguously worse.
For choices p c < δ, the tradeoff between efficiency and transfers remains.
Policy 3: changing the generosity of the assigned baseline
Another policy choice for the regulator is to set a baseline that is, in expectation, too high or too low. In other words, the government assigns the following baselines for plot i
where r* is a specified return set by the government. The fact that efficiency increases as * → −∞ is not surprising, since this is equivalent to assigning a no-forest baseline or a subsidy of p c Using (10) and making IMCF and AD functions of r* we can see that the effect of r* on PAD is ambiguous. IMCF, the amount of infra-marginally credited forest, is decreasing in r*, but so is AD. The shape of PAD is dependent on the return distribution f per hectare of forest standing. As discussed in Section 2, such a subsidy is indeed efficient but requires a large infra-marginal transfer.
r (r).
Numerical illustration. and PAD are generally conflicting policy aims for this policy option also: efficiency requires setting r* low, while minimizing PAD requires setting r* high.
The conclusions from the single-plot model also hold in the multiple-plot model. Table 4 illustrates the effect of assigning baselines that are too (un)favorable in expectation for the central case returns distribution. Notes: Each row is based on 10,000 random draws from the probability distributions. δ = pc = 0.5. σ ε = 0.5. n = 100. In Table 4 , the true baseline equals 84 (84 out of 100 plots will remain forested in absence of a policy). The table shows that increasing the baseline (i.e., making it less favorable) unambiguously reduces efficiency, AD, and opt-in probability, but also reduces PAD. This illustrates the conflicting policy objectives: achieving efficiency and avoiding deforestation comes at the expense of increased transfers for both single and multiple-plot programs.
This section has shown that only increasing project scale improves all objectives simultaneously (for "typical" returns distributions). Discounting credits and changing baseline generosity affect the objectives in opposing directions. This raises the question about how these objectives should be weighed against each other. In other words: what is the optimal deforestation policy? This question is addressed in the next section.
Choosing an Optimal Policy
The previous sections have illustrated that deforestation policies involve trade-offs between environmental outcomes, financial transfers and efficiency. This section provides a framework for how decision makers can optimally trade off these outcomes and then simulates the effects of different policy choices.
A framework for 'optimal' decision making
The optimal policy depends on whose interests are considered. A global social planner, who can require participation and faces no costs of transfers, could maximize efficiency and then redistribute the surplus to meet distributional (and political) objectives. 17 This is a useful benchmark, which we refer as the "globally efficient policy". However, in an international context, both the industrialized countries (ICs) that fund the policy and developing countries (DCs) that avoid deforestation must participate voluntarily. Our basic policy design ensures that the developing country participation constraint is met. We must now consider the participation constraint for the ICs. If we design a policy to maximize the surplus of the ICs subject to voluntary participation by DCs (so they more than meet their participation constraint) we will find a set of Pareto optimal policies. 17 This is closer to a model of domestic regulatory design and implicitly assumes a utilitarian social welfare function.
As long as there is a global aggregate surplus from the policy, the stakeholders should in theory be able to negotiate a sharing rule for the surplus and all be better off with than without the policy.
As discussed in Section 1, under assumptions we maintain in this paper, including avoided deforestation in a cap and trade system and rewarding it through an international fund are equivalent. However, when considering the cost of transferring resources between countries the systems could differ. ICs might be more likely to raise resources for a fund through distortionary taxation, while reductions under cap and trade might be an obligation placed directly on companies (implicitly a lump sum cost). However, given the politics of free allocation with cap and trade systems, the marginal resources for either could come from additional taxes or through reduced free allocation. From the DC point of view both approaches provide useful government revenue though they could be perceived differently. Thus without loss of generality we will present the optimal policy in terms of an international fund.
The fund is used to pay DCs that opt into the program. They receive p c per hectare, which leads to n hectares of avoided deforestation and m units of infra-marginal forest receiving payments. They value each dollar received at its face value. DCs forego returns r j on each of the n hectares of avoided deforestation. We assume that the global environmental gain δ is fully valued by ICs, and is not valued by DCs. 19 Payments are directly costly to ICs. In addition, transferring resources is associated with an additional cost or benefit of γ. If γ = 0, a one dollar transfer has a cost to ICs of exactly one dollar. Alternatively, γ > 0 refers to a situation in which distortionary taxes need to raise money for the fund or the IC has an aversion to paying for abatement in a DC relative to in their own country at the same cost. A third possibility is that γ < 0. Rich ICs may derive satisfaction from donating funds to poor DCs or may feel a sense of responsibility to cover a higher share of the costs of international climate mitigation.
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Under these assumptions, the costs and benefits to the different countries are
:
This specification of surplus combines the policy objectives discussed in previous sections: efficiency is captured by the first terms of the gains to DCs and ICs, AD corresponds to n, total transfers are included in the second term in the gains to ICs and m is equal to IMCF which affects PAD. Hence, this framework represents a method to balance the project objectives optimally.
As discussed in footnote 19, a global social planner will choose the efficient solution based on costless transfers (γ = 0) and then reallocate resources. The actual net global gains when transfers are costly/beneficial (γ ≠ 0) are given in (19) and differ from the globally efficient policy. When the IC participation constraint (equation (18) ≥ 0) is added so that the gains to ICs must be non-negative, we can compute a set of feasible (individually rational) policies. Our model does not predict which feasible policy will be chosen, except that the policy must be Pareto efficient. The set of feasible policies does not necessarily contain the globally efficient policy.
Equation (18) shows that if m, γ > 0, setting p c = δ will never lead to IC participation. 21 Any such policy would imply negative gains to ICs. Two options could induce IC participation. First, credits could be discounted (p c < δ). Second, the baseline could be set stringent enough to achieve m < 0. Both will reduce efficiency. If γ is negative for less than some level of transfer, implying that ICs derive some satisfaction from transferring money to DCs, there will be less need to discount credits or require stringent baselines to meet the ICs' participation constraint and the loss of efficiency is reduced.
Numerical simulations of optimal policy choices
In this section, we use the numerical simulations to determine the optimal policy, both from the global planner's and the IC-DCs' perspectives. Initially we assume that γ = 0. Using our earlier notation, the IC participation constraint is now simply δAD -TT ≥ 0. We assume that the policy will be a multiple-plot program (n = 100; subscript dropped below), since large scale 21 If γ = 0, p c = δ and m = 0 (e.g., if σ ε = 0 and the assigned baseline is unbiased), ICs are indifferent about participation.
programs dominate small scale programs (Section 3). There are two policy levers: reducing p c Section 3 presented simulation results in which these two policy levers were varied separately (Tables 3-4) . Table 3 shows the impact of changing p relative to δ and biasing downwards the assigned baseline � � � relative to its expected value.
c , while � is unbiased and fixed at 84. marginally reduces all payments for those who opt in, while the change in the opt in probability and the efficiency loss from deforesting plots with returns between δ -ε and δ is small. Similarly, a slight increase in the assigned baseline leads to first order infra-marginal gains but only secondorder losses. Hence, we conclude that there is a potential economic rationale for the simultaneous use of discounting and being strict with baselines.
As discussed above, which policy gets implemented ultimately depends on the relative bargaining positions of ICs and DCs. We imposed two constraints: (1) no party can lose relative to no policy, and (2) Summary of the main findings:
Conclusion and Policy Implications
• We conclude that under almost all circumstances, voluntary deforestation programs (or, in fact, general offset programs) will perform better with increased required scale of project. Only under very special conditions on the return distribution will increasing the required scale of the projects in the program not lead to improved policy outcomes.
• A global social planner would maximize efficiency, but this is not individually rational for ICs.
• If the ICs are averse to transferring funds to developing countries (γ ≥ 0), their preferred contract involves a combination of credit discounting (price below δ) and setting baselines stricter than business-as-usual (r* > 0). These contracts are inefficient. The feasible and Pareto efficient contract set between ICs and DCs contains contracts that involve a combination of credit discounting and stringent baselines.
• As the aversion to transfers γ falls, the tradeoff between efficiency and ICs' willingness to participate diminishes.
Our key messages for policy makers are three. First, make 'projects' as large as possible.
Regional or national scale REDD programs where funds or credits are transferred to the government on the basis of aggregated regional or national monitoring data will be much more efficient and offer better value for money. Satellite monitoring of forests is feasible and takes away any ability to cheat. DC governments will not (necessarily) achieve avoided deforestation through smaller-scale voluntary payment programs, but could use a variety of policy instruments to achieve reductions (e.g., strengthening property rights for landowners, abolishing agricultural subsidies).
Second, invest in research to improve understanding of deforestation drivers. This will allow more accurate assessment of returns and hence business as usual deforestation rates.
Moreover, this will help identify domestic policies to effectively control deforestation.
Third, the use of credit discounting or below market prices and the use of baselines more stringent than business as usual can be necessary when avoided deforestation policies depend on voluntary contributions from industrialized countries. The level of discounting and stringency required and their optimal mix depends on the developing country marginal cost of abatement (returns distribution), the level of observation errors and the industrialized countries' generosity toward developing countries.
If industrialized countries can be encouraged to be more generous it will be easier to create an efficient international REDD framework. Combined with effective domestic policies that respond to the international incentives, this could meet the expectations of those who promote avoided deforestation as a key climate mitigation option in the short term.
Appendices Appendix 1 -Proof of Proposition 2
We calculate the efficiency gain ∆S n=2 from 2-plot REDD relative to no policy, and compare this to the efficiency gain 2*∆S with has many realizations in area C in Figure 6 , which can reduce efficiency by Proposition 2 (in the 2-plot model). In fact, we find that a single-plot policy is more efficient than a 2-plot policy.
However, such distributions are highly stylized and unlikely to represent true returns distributions. Figure A1 summarizes this finding by plotting the efficiency gain as a fraction of the efficient (σ ε = 0) solution. Figure A1 . The impact on efficiency of increasing the project scale, for n = 1, 2, 10 and 100. Table A2 shows that the conclusion in Section 3.1.3 ( Table 2) Table A2 . The impact of spatially correlated returns and observation errors, for n = 1 and n = 100 for an alternative returns distribution.
f r 1-plot (r) 100-1-plot 100-1-plot 100-1-plot 100- Notes: Each row is based on 10,000 random draws from the probability distributions. δ = pc = 0.5. σ ε = 0.5. Assigned baselines are "unbiased". 
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